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 Economics has two predominant theories concerning regulation.  On one side public interest 
theory contends that to improve social welfare the government will regulate markets that have 
failed or created externalities detrimental to social welfare.  On the other side, private interest 
theory (Stigler 1971) contends the government will regulate in response to the private interests of 
groups able to wield political influence.  Criticism of the public interest theory of regulation 
currently exists, but while most people accept the private interest theory as the theory applicable 
to a variety of economic regulations today, one might expect that if an economic theory of 
regulation were relevant to the regulation surrounding public health, it would be the public 
interest theory.   
 
The alcohol industry has long been an industry surrounded by controversy, and one with a long 
history of regulation.  In United States’ colonial times alcohol was considered by groups an 
immoral substance; in modern times alcohol has been shown a contributor to public health 
concerns.  Moral concerns have been historically cited as the motivation behind regulation 
encompassing the industry and the Prohibition Movement in the U.S. during the 1920’s, although 
public health is often the cited reason in modern times.  Numerous medical organizations like the 
American Medical Association and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
have published research showing the correlation between increased alcohol consumption and 
deteriorating public health.  Concern for public health associated with drunken driving casualties, 
particularly among teens and young adults, incidence of liver disease and other illnesses 
imposing costs on public health services, and alcohol-related incidence of abuse are the more 
common public health concerns highlighted in calls for increased regulation of alcohol.   
Economists add to the debate with conflicting research determining how regulatory policies and economic factors such as personal income and elasticity of alcoholic products affect the demand 
for and consumption of alcohol.  Given the controversy surrounding the industry, it may not be 
surprising that alcohol is one of the most highly regulated consumer product industries in the 
U.S., and given the correlation between alcohol consumption and public health, we should 
expect the motivation behind improving public health and therefore regulation to curb 
consumption of alcohol industry products to be motivated by public interest.  This article 
attempts to test if the variation between states regulatory policies of the alcohol industry can be 
explained by the public interest theory of regulation. 
 
Health Effects of Alcohol Consumption 
Numerous medical studies have determined that consumption of alcohol can have varying health 
effects including both short- and long-term effects and both positive and negative.  Reported 
positive short-term effects include desirable social outcomes and relaxation; while negative 
short-term effects include impaired judgment, hangovers, black-outs, drunken driving violations, 
violence, family problems, and absence or loss of productivity at work (USDHHS 2004).   
Although long-term positive health effects of moderate alcohol consumption may include a 
possible reduction in heart disease, gallstones and type-two diabetes, for most consumers the 
negative health effects can outweigh the positive.  Direct negative long-term health effects can 
include alcoholism, alcohol abuse, liver disease, heart disease, cancer, and pancreatis for all 
drinkers, and possible alcohol related birth defects for women drinkers (USDHHS 2004).  Other 
social and legal negative long-term effects may include early death, divorce, family problems, 
loss of employment, increased crime, and increased medical expenses (Cook and Moore 2000).    The various health effects of alcohol consumption afford many measures of public health 
used by researchers.  Typical measures of public health used in economic studies include 
mortality, vehicle fatalities and accidents (Chaloupka, Grossman and Saffer 1998; Ruhm 1995; 
Saffer 1997), binge-drinking (Williams, Chaloupka, and Wechsler 2002; Kuo et al 2003), 
adolescent alcohol consumption (Saffer and Dave 2003; Cook and Moore 2000), crime, 
alcoholism and alcohol abuse (Pogue and Sgontz 1989), and other physical effects such as liver 
cirrhosis or risky teen sexual activity (Dills and Miron 2002; Carpenter 2005; Markowitz, 
Grossman, and Kaestner 2005).  These measures of public health tend to be modeled as the 
dependent variable when testing for the marginal impact of government policy and regulation.   
Almost all public health measures are developed from aggregate data, although some are 
modeled from individual data, and many face endogeniety, autocorrelation, and measurement 
issues.  Using any of these measures as explanatory variables for state regulatory level can lead 
to endogeniety issues, as level of public health and level of state regulation are simultaneously 
determined.  Also, any of the public health measures that are typical externalities of heavy 
drinking (vehicle fatalities and accidents, alcoholism and alcohol abuse, and liver cirrhosis) 
might exclude explanatory power for regulation that equally applies to all types of alcohol 
consumers. 
 
Alcohol Regulatory Effect on Public Health 
The government has four policy measures to regulate alcohol:  it sets limitations on the sale of 
alcohol, including requiring special retail licenses and determining when, where and how 
alcoholic beverages may be sold and their prices advertised; it sets the MLDA; it sets penalties for drunk-driving; and it sets and collects excise taxes on alcoholic products (McGowan 1997; 
Cook and Moore 2000; Cook and Moore 2002).   
  Since each of the government’s policy measures is directly or indirectly aimed at curbing 
alcohol consumption by influencing demand for the products, it is important to understand the 
demand.  Cook and Moore (2000) review an extensive body of economic literature that focuses 
on modeling and testing specific regulations on the demand for alcoholic beverages.  Cook and 
Moore determine a consensus in which a number of studies estimating the demand for alcoholic 
beverages find the own-price elasticity for each beer, wine and distilled spirits, to be negative 
and elastic for the general population of alcohol consumers (Cook and Moore 2000; Cook and 
Moore 2002; Chaloupka, Grossman and Saffer 1998; Johnson and Oksanen 1977).  Since beer is 
the most elastic (in terms of absolute value),  the demand for beer should be the most responsive 
to price changes, while distilled spirits tend to be the least responsive to price (Cook and Moore 
2002).  This negative elasticity, calculated with both aggregate and individual data, implies that 
alcohol is consumed as a non-Giffen good, or that when other factors remain equal and the price 
of alcohol rises, consumers will demand less alcohol.  Major policy implications result from 
these elasticity estimates, which imply that raising alcohol prices can lower alcohol consumption.  
Although when consumers demand less alcohol, they may not be necessarily demanding less 
quantity of alcohol products, but may be substituting higher-priced quality for lower-priced 
quantity of the same alcoholic product (Kenkel, et al 1994).  Because a standard drink can be 
uniformly defined as one 12-ounce bottle of beer, one 5-ounce glass of wine, or 1.5 ounces of 
80-proof distilled spirits, substituting quality of product may not result in a decrease of alcohol 
consumed (USDHHS 2004).   
 Taxes and Increased Beverage Prices on Consumption   
One of the most common findings and policy recommendations in the alcohol public health 
literature is related to excise taxes on alcohol.  Most studies recommend the excise tax on alcohol 
be raised, as a means to discourage public consumption, especially consumption by youths.   
Pogue and Sgontz (1989) determined that average excise tax levels, for all government levels, 
would have had to double in 1989, to keep up with inflation and equal the previous 1951 excise 
tax level.  Even though the government raised the excise taxes on alcohol in 1991, and taxes on 
beer doubled and distilled spirits increased, the raise still did not offset inflation, and real prices 
of alcohol have continued to decline over time (Chaloupka, Grossman and Saffer 1998).   
  Increased excise taxes would feasibly increase the direct price paid for alcoholic 
products, which should decrease the quantity of alcohol consumed, as per the law of demand. 
Decreased consumption through increased excise taxes can be directly attributed to the negative 
elastic nature of alcoholic products, and improved health effects are hypothesized to result from 
that decreased consumption. 
  Opponents of an increased excise tax is typically the beer industry which markets and 
sells most of its product, by volume, to young adults that have lower disposable income levels. 
Because of the regressive nature of an increased excise tax, the demand for and sales of beer 
products would be most affected by an excise increase.  The wine and distilled spirits industries 
would not be as affected, primarily because the typical wine consumer is older and has a higher 
disposable income, and the excise tax on distilled spirits is already more than double that of beer 
and wine.  Although the beer industry is against the increased excise tax because of its regressive 
nature, proponents use the regressive nature of the tax to their advantage.  Because a high 
number of binge and heavy drinkers are young adults or underage adolescents with lower or fixed incomes, an increased tax would directly affect their ability to consume alcohol, which 
could have an impact on public health measures such as drunk driving or risky teen sexual 
activity.   
  One criticism of the current tax regime is that all types of drinkers are taxed at the same 
rate, when heavy drinkers and alcoholics are assumed to consume the highest proportion of 
alcohol, and could have different demand drivers and elasticity for alcoholic products than the 
general population.  Pogue and Sgontz (1989) propose a framework that would determine 
alcohol tax rates using efficiency criteria to modify standard welfare theory.  They find that the 
optimal tax rate will increase when the relative demand elasticity’s of both typical and heavy 
drinkers are taken into account, and specifically determine the average tax rate in 1989 should 
have been at least double the 25% rate that it was. 
  Literature on taxes and increased beverage prices also concludes an increase in excise 
taxes could lead to improved economic and socioeconomic factors.  Kenkel’s, et al (1994) article 
using human capital models of the determinants of earnings shows that alcohol consumption by 
young adults affects their labor productivity, earnings, and family life.  
 
Legal Age Restrictions on Consumption 
The primary legal age restriction on consumption is the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA), 
enacted by all states by 1988.  The law, which raised the legal drinking age from18 or 19 
depending on the state, to 21 for all states, was a restriction specifically targeted to younger 
drinkers, which typically have a higher incidence of alcohol related problems.  The NHTSA has 
estimated the raising of the MLDA to 21 has prevented between 700-1000 annual deaths from youth traffic accidents, although they do not speculate how many of those deaths have been 
saved as a direct result of reduced impaired driving from alcohol consumption (USDOT 2000).   
 
Restrictions of Retail Sites on Consumption   
There are numerous limitations that states can place on establishments that sell alcohol, either for 
on-premise or off-premise consumption, which can all reduce the ability of consumers to 
purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.  State limitations can include requiring specific 
licenses to sell, limitations or prohibiting advertising of prices, limiting or prohibiting “happy 
hours”, MLDA, and “dram shop laws”, which could make the retailer liable for any damage done 
by a drinker, that drank too much while at that retailer.  A recent article by Kuo, et al (2003) 
looked at the proximity of bars close to college campuses, and the effects that bars’ proximity to 
campus, advertising, and “happy hour” drink specials had on the binge drinking (defined as 5 or 
more drinks in one setting for men and four or more drinks in one setting for women) of college 
students.  Their results showed that the frequency of promotions by bars, and the volume of 
alcohol available during those promotions, caused higher levels of binge drinking on college 
campuses.   
  Other articles focus on the advertising limitations placed upon the general industry and 
retail establishments, because as Saffer (1997, p. 431) points out, the “central issue in this debate 
over alcohol advertising is whether the effect of alcohol advertising is limited to brand choice or 
whether alcohol advertising also increases total alcohol consumption”.  The implications that 
advertising has effects on amount of actual consumption is very important to studies that focus 
on youth consumption, as many alcoholic advertisements are found in magazines that are read by 
youths, although youths are not the target demographic of that magazine (Nelson 2005).   Many advertising studies do find that although there are restrictions on alcohol advertising to prevent 
adolescents from reacting, many adolescents are exposed to the advertising anyway and develop 
brand loyalties to alcoholic beverages before they reach the legal drinking age.   
 
Drunk-Driving Laws  
One of the most noticeable externalities associated with alcohol consumption is drunk-driving.  
Drunk-driving is determined by the drivers Blood Alcohol Content and is determined routinely 
when drivers are stopped by the police for suspected alcoholic intoxication.  For those 21 or 
older, intoxicated is formally considered a BAC of 0.08 grams per deciliter (USDOT 2000), but   
national “Zero tolerance” laws make it illegal for youths under 21 to drive with any positive 
BAC level (USDOT 2000).     
  Penalties of drunk-driving are typically factored into the “full price” of alcoholic 
beverages, instead of the direct price like excise taxes (Chaloupka, Grossman and Saffer 1998), 
although NHTSA has estimated the direct savings per driver that lowering the BAC, and 
implementing “zero tolerance” laws for youths, have had (USDOT 2000).  Drunk-driving 
measures such as vehicle fatalities or accidents also tend to be modeled as the dependent variable 
when empirical studies are performed on the effects of advertising on consumption (Saffer 
1997), but little research on the direct impact of drunken driving laws on alcoholic consumption 
is available.   
  The most common conclusions that emerges from the literature that tests regulation’s 
effect on alcohol consumption is that regulation does have an impact on alcohol consumption. 
Because the demand for alcoholic beverages has been shown to be the same pattern as the 
demand for other normal goods, the regulation most cited to have an impact on consumption is excise taxes.  Specifically cited is an increase in the excise tax on alcohol will lead to higher 
prices and reduce alcohol consumption.  Other conclusions in the literature generally show that 
restricting access to alcohol, either through site, age or advertising restrictions, can reduce 
consumption. 
 
Threads within Economic Literature 
As just shown, there are numerous papers that study the regulatory effects on public health.  
These studies taken together form two of the three research threads within the economic 
literature on the alcohol industry: research focused on factors affecting consumer demand for the 
product and research focused on effects related to consumption of the product.  The third thread, 
research focused on industry structure and logistics, is not typically considered in the context of 
alcohol and public health.  Economists focused on the first two veins have typically researched 
the effects of specific policies and regulations on consumption, as we saw in above.  The 
purposes of many of these studies can be grouped into three broad areas: the demand for and 
consumption of alcoholic beverages (Johnson and Oksanen 1977); the effects of regulatory 
policies on public health measures, such as price on consumption (Chaloupka, Grossman and 
Saffer 1998) and taxes as a means of curbing consumption (Pogue and Sgontz 1989; Tremblay 
and Okuyama 2001); and the effects of limitations on the sale and distribution of alcohol, such as 
advertising on consumption (Kuo et al 2003).   
  Cook and Moore (2000) review an extensive body of economic literature that focuses on 
modeling and testing specific regulations on the demand for alcoholic beverages, while Johnson 
and Osanken (1977) performed one of the first studies to empirically test for the significance of 
price and socioeconomic factors on consumption rates.  Articles in the demand and consumption thread broadly confirm the elasticity of alcohol’s status as a non-Giffen good, and the underlying 
motivation of articles in the thread is not a concern for public health, but a general inquiry into 
the product’s market demand. 
 
Effects of Regulatory Policies on Public Health Measures 
The four government regulatory policies are typically tested with respect to their effectiveness on 
public health measures.  Research testing the effects of regulatory policies on health measures 
typically models a type of regulatory policy as the independent variable with a public health 
measure as the dependent variable.  Ruhm (1995), Carpenter (2005) and Markowitz, Grossman, 
and Kaestner (2005) all researched the effects of one or two of the general types of government 
regulation on different public health measures, while Chaloupka, Grossman and Saffer (1998) 
reviewed many empirical studies that looked at the effects of the “full price” of alcohol on 
drinking and driving.  Ruhm (1995) found that macroeconomic factors of the economy affect the 
consumption of alcohol and vehicle fatalities related to alcohol, but only indirectly through 
consumption.  He also found that certain regulatory policies like MLDA and the excise tax 
affected consumption, which in turn reduced the motor vehicle fatality rate.  Carpenter (2005) 
found the adoption of zero tolerance laws was associated with a significant reduction in youth 
male sexually transmitted diseases, while  Markowitz, Grossman, and Kaestner (2005), looked at 
the effect of alcohol consumption on risky teen sexual behavior.  
The results of any one of these articles is not necessarily striking, but combined, the 
research shows consumption impacts public health and specific regulations do have an impact on 
curbing alcohol consumption and/or reducing some of the harmful externalities alcohol consumption can have.  Researching the effectiveness of specific alcohol regulations can help 
determine which regulations have the greatest benefit and are the most cost beneficial.   
 
Limitations on Sale and Distribution of Alcohol 
Most of the articles researching limitations on sale and distribution focus on the effects that 
limiting the sale of alcohol through restrictions on advertising and/or distribution can have on 
measures of public health (ability of consumers to consume).  Many articles test the restriction 
on the sale of alcohol by primary testing the restrictions on advertising, although some do focus 
on distribution restrictions.   
  Other research on advertising effects include Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) and Wiseman 
and Ellig (2005).  Both papers provide a different analysis on advertising restrictions through 
their focuses on the effects of advertising on retail prices and direct shipping (respectively), with 
no underlying motivation tied to public health.  Their articles are also a bit different, in that both 
sets of authors look at the differences in retail prices when restrictions on advertising and direct 
shipping are relaxed.   
 
Implications  
The literature in these three broad areas shows researchers study the effects of regulatory policies 
aimed at curbing demand and consumption, and implicitly accept the idea of public health as the 
motivation behind alcohol industry regulations.  When testing for alcohol consumption and the 
effects of various regulatory policies on public health, researchers take regulatory policies 
surrounding the industry as exogenous; when really an argument could be made the regulatory 
regime is endogenously determined as the level of public health and level of state regulation are simultaneously determined.  Also, few consider the possible significance that different public 
health arguments could have varying impacts on the regulatory policies implemented across 
states.  Given the conflict between the two economic theories of regulation, it is surprising that 
little economic research exists to test this idea of public health (and therefore public interest 
theory) as the true motivator behind regulatory policies surrounding the industry; although 
determining if public health concern is the true motivator should be a noteworthy question to 
economists and policy makers alike.   
Since states are given the right to regulate production, distribution and sale of alcohol by 
the 21
st Amendment, testing the differences in state’s public, economic and political health and 
state beer excise taxes over time is a natural experiment to determine the motivation behind the 
regulations.  As previously mentioned, researchers typically fail to control for the endogeniety of 
state regulations, and also biasness or omitted variable problems can arise when using cross-
sectional data if there are underlying latent variables correlated with both the manifest dependent 
and independent variables.  Using a state-level fixed effects model to test nine years of cross-
sectional data can help to control for some of that bias and will allow for control of factors that 
may vary across states but remain fixed within states across time.   
Determining the true motivation of alcohol regulation can have specific impacts for 
policy makers responsible for regulating the industry, and the results can be generalizable to any 
industry that has public health concerns and consequences.  Sin industries such as gambling and 
tobacco can benefit from this research, as can regulations affecting the environment.  The 
research also has implications for other public health and social welfare policy debates such as 
the fatty food tax debate.  
  Theory  
The underlying theory for testing the motivation behind alcohol industry regulation is the public 
interest theory of regulation.  Because the public interest theory predicts regulation to occur in 
markets that have failed or created externalities detrimental to social welfare, we should expect 
to see regulation of an industry that’s products contribute to harmful externalities, motivated by 
public interest.   
 Harmful  social  externalities  resulting from alcohol consumption could result from any of 
the negative effects associated with consumption.  Reported negative short-term effects include 
impaired judgment, hangovers, black-outs, drunken driving violations, violence, family 
problems, and absence or loss of productivity at work.  Direct negative long-term health effects 
can include alcoholism, alcohol abuse, liver disease, heart disease, cancer, and pancreatis for all 
drinkers, and possible alcohol related birth defects for women drinkers (USDHHS 2004).  Other 
social and legal negative long-term effects may include early death, divorce, family problems, 
loss of employment, increased crime, and increased medical expenses (Cook and Moore 2000).  
If concern for public health and the negative externalities caused by alcohol consumption is the 
motivation behind alcohol regulation, then when testing for motivation, should expect to find 
support for the public interest theory.   
It should be noted that although most economic research focused on alcohol policy does 
implicitly accept public health as the motivator behind industry regulation, there are some studies 
that explore alcohol industry applications to test the idea of regulation as a function of private 
interests.  The focus of most of these studies is not on public theory of regulation versus private 
theory as motivators for alcoholic regulations, but on other subjects (Wolfson (1995) focuses on 
the impact of social movement organizations on legislative actions, while Kubik, Milyo and Moran (2006) focus is campaign finance).  Only Reikof and Sykuta (2005) have the explicit 
purpose of testing Stigler’s private theory of regulation as it related to alcohol industry logistics 
and distribution, and they found that private interests played a role in the ability of some state’s 
wineries to legally ship wine direct to consumers.   
 
Model  
The economic model for this article is the fixed effects model utilized by Ruhm (1995) in his 
“Economic Conditions and Alcohol Problems” paper.  Ruhm tested for the effects of 
macroeconomic conditions on alcohol-related outcomes using pooled state-level data over a 14 
year time period, and he used a fixed-effects model to control for within states’ macroeconomic 
conditions.  Similarly, this article uses a fixed effects model, but to account for the differences 
between states alcohol excise taxes.   
  Specifically this article uses the fixed-effects model: 
Yit = αt + Vitθ + Xitβ + Zitγ + Witδ + Si + λit 
where Yit is the value of the dependent variable for state i at time t, V is consumption per state 
per time, X is the measure of socioeconomic conditions; Z is the measure of political conditions, 
including both current and lagged variables; W is the measure of public health conditions, 
including some current and lagged variables; and λ is an error term.  The intercept, α, is a time-
specific value that accounts for time-varying characteristics that influence state beer excise tax 
rate.  The state-fixed effect, S, is a vector of dummy variables that controls for factors that vary 
across states but remain fixed within states across time.  
  The dependent variable in the full model is state beer excise tax rates for each of the 50 
states, collected over the nine-year period, 1995-2003. The data is collected over the time period to account for any exogenous changes faced by all states, not for variation within a state across 
time. The V-variable is total per capita beer consumption, and the X-variables measuring 
socioeconomic conditions include state unemployment rates, change in state GDP, the state 
Poverty Rate, and state per capita Personal Income.  The Z-variables measuring political factors 
include a lagged dummy variable controlling for the control of a political party over both a 
state’s legislature and governor’s office, a dummy variable accounting for a state’s direct control 
over sale and total state campaign contributions by firms and employees of the alcohol industry.  
The W-variables measuring state public health conditions include a lagged measure of the state 
driver vehicle fatality rate involving alcohol and a lagged measure of the state aggravated assault 
violence rate.  Table 1 below describes variables to be included in the analysis and the predicted 
effects for each independent variable.  Most of the political and public health variables are 
lagged to account for the correlation between the variables.  
 
Hypotheses 
Expecting to find support for the public interest theory of regulation can lead us to hypothesize 
the effects that political and public health variables will have on alcohol tax rates as a proxy for 
alcohol regulation. 
  Scenario A:  Public health theory is the true motivator behind alcoholic regulations. 
Hypothesis 1a:  The variables proxying public health will be significantly different from 
zero.  
  Hypothesis 2a: The greater a state’s public health problem (with relation to alcohol 
consumption) and therefore public interest, the larger the state’s beer excise tax. 
 
 
 Table 1. Definitions and Predicted Variable Signs  
Variable 
Category 
Variable Name  Definition  Predicted 
sign
a 
Y  Tax  Excise tax rate on a gallon of beer  Dep. variable 
Unemployment  Rate of unemployment rate of in the 
state 
NP 
GDP  Change in a state’s GDP from the 
previous year 
NP 




Income  State’s per capita income  NP 
Political  Dummy variable set to one if a state’s 
legislative and governor’s office are 
controlled by the same political party; 
1 if both are Republican  
NP 
Control  Dummy variable set to one if a state 








Contributions  Total campaign contributions by 
businesses and employees of the 
alcohol industry 
- or no change 
V  Consumption  State per capita alcohol consumption 
of beer 
- 
Vehicle  Rate of drivers involved in vehicle 
fatalities with a BAC = 0.01+ 
+   
 
W  Assault  State Aggravated Assault Rate per 
100,000 people 
+ 
aNP, no prediction 
 
  Scenario B:  Private interest theory is the true motivator behind alcoholic regulations. 
  Hypothesis 1b:  The variables proxying private interest will be significantly different 
from zero. 
  Hypothesis 2b:  The greater the private interests in the state, the smaller the state’s beer 
excise tax. 
    Although the above hypotheses have been set up in an either-or fashion, it could be true 
that both public and private interests jointly influence alcohol regulatory policy, and therefore a 
third scenario can arise: 
   Scenario C:  Both public and private interest theory motivate alcohol regulations. 
  Hypothesis 1c:  The variables proxying public and private interest will be significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Data 
For those variables that have been lagged, data has been collected for the corresponding time 
period.  Unemployment and poverty rates were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau, while 
GDP and per capital income were collected from the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis and 
aggravated assault violence rates were collected from the U.S. Department of Justice.  Also 
historical partisan control of states’ legislatures and governor’s offices were collected from the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract of the United States. State alcohol excise tax rates and 
per capita alcohol consumption were collected from the Brewer’s Almanac, published by the 
U.S. Beer Institute, while state campaign contributions were collected from The Institute on 
Money in State Politics.  Finally, the driver vehicle fatality rate associated with alcohol is 
available from the State Alcohol Related Fatality Rates report, published by the U.S. Department 
of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.  
 
Results and Conclusions 
Table 2 presents results that are not striking, but do lend support for the hypotheses.  Viewed 
individually, campaign contributions and aggravated assault are both statistically significant at 
the 10% level across the majority of tests.  Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c are both supported, in that 
at least one of the variables proxying public health and private interests are significantly different 
from zero when tested separately and when jointly tested.  But, although the hypotheses have support and the variables are statistically significant, their values are not economically 
significant and both variables seem to have negligible influence on a states’ beer excise tax rate.  
Hypothesis 1a, that public interest theory is the true motivator behind alcohol regulations, is not 
supported if all of the public health proxies are jointly tested, as the vehicle fatality rate is not 
significant.  Similarly Hypothesis 1b, that private interest theory is the true motivator behind 
alcohol regulations, is not supported if all of the private interest proxies are jointly tested, as the 
indicator of dominant partisan control of a state’s executive and legislature is not significant.  
Hypothesis 1c, that both public and private interest theories could be jointly motivating alcohol 
regulation, is supported if the assault rate and campaign contributions are jointly tested, but if all 
the public health and private interest proxies are tested together, is not supported.   
  It should also be noted that both variables resulted in the opposite sign than predicted.  
Aggravated assault had a negative sign which implies that as assault increases, the tax rate would 
decrease, although from a health prospective, that doesn’t seem plausible.  Per capita 
consumption did result with the anticipated sign, although it was only significant when tested as 
a lone indicator of a states’ beer excise tax rate.   
  Although Hypothesis 1a were not proven significant, Hypothesis 2a, the greater a state’s 
public health problem (with relation to alcohol consumption) and therefore public interest, the 
larger the state’s beer excise tax, can also be tested.  Comparing the means of the states’ beer 
excise tax with the mean of the states’ consumption rates shows that on average states with 
higher consumption rates (24+ gallons consumed per capita) tend to have higher excise tax rates.  
Although this is shown on average, there are notable exceptions.  North Dakota has an average 
consumption of 27.78 gallons consumed per capita and a tax rate of only $0.16/gallon and 
Nevada has an average consumption of 32.16 gallons per person and a tax rate of only $0.09/gallon.  Similarly, Utah has one of the lowest consumption rates at 12.73 gallons per capita 
and one of the highest tax rates of $0.41/gallon.  
  Although this article may not be conclusive in determining which theory of economic 
regulation is the true motivation behind alcohol regulation it does take steps to narrow and test if 
either theory is the predominate motivator, an issue not previously addressed.  This article also 
raises interesting questions about the motivation behind certain alcohol regulations and offers 
avenues for future research through those questions.  Consumers and regulatory policy can only 
benefit from knowing the true motivator behind alcohol regulation, and this article has presented 
one foray into answering that question. Table 2.  Fixed Effects Estimates of Relationship Between 
Beer Excise Tax and Public and Private Interest Measures 
Regressor  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)  (f) 
Dependent Variable = Beer Excise Tax Rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.28600 -0.65016        
Change in GDP  -0.00024385 0.000225       
Poverty rate  -0.07956 1.087564        
Per capita income  -0.00028164 -0.00008       




of Governor and 










0.000018  0.000017 
(4.02) 
  0.000015 
(3.36) 
 
State control, sale 
of products  
7.30543 
(1.72) 
0     0   
Alcohol involved 
Vehicle Fatalities  
at t-1 
0.16111 -0.17145    -0.1089 0.013217   
Aggravated 












None State State State  State State 
Notes:  The first panel estimates the model by ordinary least squares.  The other panels 
estimate the model using generalized least squares.  Significant values at the 10% level are 
presented with their t-statistics.References 
 
Carpenter, C. 2005 “Youth alcohol use and risky sexual behavior:  Evidence from underage 
  drunk driving laws.” Journal of Health Economic 24: 613-628. 
Chaloupka, F. J., M. Grossman, and H. Saffer. 1998. “The Effects of Price on the Consequences 
  of Alcohol Use and Abuse.” In Galanter, ed. Recent Developments in Alcoholism, Volume 
  14: The Consequences of Alcoholism. New York: Plenum Press. 
Cook, P., and M.J. Moore. 2000. “Alcohol.” In A. Culyer, and J. Newhouse, ed. Handbook of 
  Health Economics, volume 1B.  Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Cook, P., and M.J. Moore. 2002. "The Economics of Alcohol Abuse and Alcohol-Control 
 Policies."  Health Affairs 21: 120-133. 
Dills, A., and J. Miron. 2002 “Alcohol Prohibition and Cirrhosis.” Working paper, Dept. of 
  Econ., Boston University. 
Johnson, J.A., and E.H. Oksanen. 1977. “Estimation of Demand for Alcoholic Beverages in 
  Canada From Pooled Time Series and Cross Sections.” The Review of Economics and 
 Statistics  59: 113-118. 
Kenkel, D.S., P.J. Cook, S. Peltzman, and D.C. Ribar. 1994. “Alcohol Consumption and Young 
  Adults’ Socioeconomic Status.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
 Microeconomics: 119-175. 
Kubik, J., J. Milyo and J. Moran.  2005. “The Effects of Campaign Finance Laws on State Excise 
  Taxes on Alcohol and Tobacco” Working Paper, Dept. of Econ., Syracuse University. 
Kuo, M., H. Lee, P. Greenberg, and H. Wechsler. 2003. “The Marketing of Alcohol to College 
  Students:  The Role of Low Prices and Special Promotions.” American Journal of 
 Preventative  Medicine 25 (3).  Markowitz, S., M. Grossman, and R. Kaestner. 2005. “An Investigation of the Effects of Alcohol 
  Consumption and Alcohol Policies on Youth Risky Sexual Behavior.” Working paper.  
  National Bureau of Economic Research No. 11378. 
McGowan, R. 1997. Government Regulation of the Alcohol Industry: The Search for the 
  Revenue and the Common Good. Westport, CN: Quorum Books. 
Milyo, J., and J. Waldfogel. 1999. “The Effect of Price Advertising on Prices:  Evidence in the 
 Wake  of  44 Liquormart.” The American Economic Review: 1081-1096. 
Nelson, J.P. 2005. “Advertising, Alcohol and Youth.” Regulation, Summer, pp. 40-47. 
Pogue, T.F., and Sgontz L.G. 1989. “Taxing to Control Social Costs:  The Case of Alcohol.” The 
  American Economic Review 79: 235-243. 
Riekhof, G.M., and M.E. Sykuta. 2005. “Politics, Economics, and the Regulation of Direct 
  Interstate Shipping in the Wine Industry.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
 87:  439-452. 
Ruhm, C. 1995. “Economic Conditions of and Alcohol Problems.” Journal of Health Economics 
  14: 583-603.  
Saffer, H. 1997. “Alcohol Advertising and Motor Vehicle Fatalities.” The Review of Economics 
 and  Statistics  79: 431-442. 
Saffer, H., and D. Dave. 2003. “Alcohol Advertising and Alcohol Consumption by Adolescents.” 
  Working paper. National Bureau of Economics Research. 
Stigler, G.J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” The Bell Journal of Economics and 
 Management  Science 2: 3-21. 
Tremblay, V.J., and K. Okuyama. 2001. “Advertising Restrictions, Competition, and Alcohol 
 Consumption.”  Contemporary Economic Policy 19: 313-321.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
  Alcoholism.  2004.  Alcohol-What You Don’t Know Can Harm You.  Bethesda, MD 
U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
 2000.    Impaired driving in the United States, 2000: alcohol. Washington, DC 
Williams, J., F.J. Chaloupka, and H. Wechsler. 2002. “Are There Differential Effects of Price 
  and Policy on College Students’ Drinking Intensity.” Working paper. National Bureau of 
  Economic Research No. 8702. 
Wiseman, A.E., and J. Ellig. 2005. “Legislative Action and Market Responses:  Results of 
  Virginia’s Natural Experiment with Direct Wine Shipment.” Working paper. Federal 
  Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics. 
Wolfson, M. 1995. “The Legislative Impact of Social Movement Organizations:  The Anti-
  Drunken-Driving Movement and the 21-Year-Old Driving Age.” Social Science 
 Quarterly 76: 311-327. 
    
 
 